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Abstract 
This paper analyses the impact of economic conditions and access to primary health 
care on health outcomes in Norway. Total mortality rates, grouped into four causes of 
death, were used as proxies for health, and the number of general practitioners (GPs) 
at the municipality level was used as the proxy for access to primary health care. 
Dynamic panel data models that allow for time persistence in mortality rates, 
incorporate municipal fixed effects, and treat both the number and types of GPs in a 
district as endogenous were estimated using municipality data from 1986 to 2001. We 
reject the significant relationship between mortality and the number of GPs per capita 
found in most previous studies. However, there is a significant effect of the 
composition of GPs, where an increase in the number of fee-for-service GPs reduces 
mortality rates when compared with GPs employed directly by the municipality. 
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The health sector has grown rapidly in most developed countries over the last few 
decades. Government decisions affect the allocation of resources both to and within 
the sector. To evaluate the effectiveness of medical intervention without market 
prices, it is necessary to know the cost and returns to resource use and interventions in 
the sector. The key outcome of most health intervention is reduced mortality and 
morbidity, and better quality of life.  
 
Three different lines of research on mortality can be identified in the economic 
literature. Some studies have analysed the relationship between economic resources 
and health outcomes. Most of these papers focus on the effects of economic 
conditions such as unemployment rates or aggregate measures of income on mortality 
(e.g., Auster et al., 1969; Forbes and McGregor, 1984; Gravelle, 1984; Leu, 1986; 
Hitiris and Posnett, 1992; Grubaugh and Santerre, 1994; Joyce and Mocan, 1997; 
Ruhm, 2000, 2003; Cutler et al., 2002). Other studies have focused on mortality rates 
at the hospital level, where resource use, policy changes relating to reimbursement 
rates, doctor and nurse staffing, managed care, and technological change are 
important explanatory factors for mortality rates (e.g., Cutler, 1995; McClellan and 
Noguchi, 1998; Hartz et al., 1989; Manheim et al. 1992; Kessler and McClellan, 
2000; Geweke et al., 2003; Mark et al., 2004). A third line of research has focused on 
the effect of the number of physicians or general practitioners (GPs) in a district 
(usually US state level or national level) on mortality (e.g., Auster et al., 1969; 
Grubaugh and Santerre, 1994; Robst and Graham, 1997; Robst, 2001; Or, 2000, Or et 
al., 2005). 
 
In our study, we analyse the relationship between access to primary care (proxied by 
the number of GPs at the municipality level) and health outcomes (proxied by 
mortality rates divided into four groups of causes of death) within a health production 
function framework (see Auster et al., 1969). Mortality rates change over time and 
vary substantially across municipalities, largely because of age and gender   3
differences, but also due to other factors.
1 The number of GPs may affect mortality, 
but mortality may also affect the future number of GPs in a district. This creates a 
simultaneity problem, not previously handled in a panel data framework for this line 
of research, which may seriously bias the results from previous studies. In addition, 
there is a high degree of persistence in mortality rates over time. We estimate an 
econometric panel data model that accounts for the simultaneity problem between 
GPs (both the number and type) and mortality rates, incorporates municipality fixed 
effects, and allows for the influence of past mortality rates of current rates, using 
longitudinal data for 435 municipalities over a 16-year period from 1986 to 2001. 
 
Using standard econometric techniques previously used in the literature (i.e., fixed-
effects models) we find a negative effect of the per capita number of GPs on mortality 
rates. However, we do not find any significant effect of GPs on mortality rates once 
we allow for simultaneity between number of GPs and mortality rates in our dynamic 
regression model. This contradicts several studies that have found significant and 
negative effects of the number of GPs on mortality (Grubaugh and Santerre, 1994; 
Robst and Graham, 1997; Robst, 2001; Or et al., 2005).
2 However, we find a 
significant effect of the composition of GPs, where more fee-for-service GPs reduce 
mortality rates compared with GPs employed directly by the municipality. 
 
The paper proceeds in Section 2 with a description of the institutional settings for the 
primary health care sector relevant for this study. Section 3 presents data used in the 
analysis, with descriptive statistics. A discussion of the econometric model used in 
analysing the relationship between mortality and access to health care follows in 
                                                 
1 Mortality is only one measure of health status. Morbidity and other subjective indicators of well-
being are also likely to be affected by economic factors. There is a huge literature on the relationship 
between socio-economic condition and self-reported measures of health. We use mortality rates 
because this measure of health is easily quantifiable and has been precisely measured over time. A 
closely related alternative to mortality rates would be the expected average length of life at birth. The 
correlation between mortality rates and life expectancy is very high, around 0.9. However, the expected 
average length of life varies for different causes of death. This is not the case for mortality rates. Thus, 
the mortality rate is a consistent measure of health between different causes of death, and makes our 
study comparable with studies from other countries. We divide causes of death in the estimation of 
mortality rates into four groups: a) malignant neoplasm (cancer); b) diseases of the circulatory system 
(cerebrovascular diseases, ischaemic heart diseases, and other heart diseases); c) diseases of the 
respiratory system (for example, pneumonia, bronchitis, emphysema, and asthma); and d) other causes 
(such as accidents, suicide, diseases of the digestive system, and mental disorders). 
 
2 These studies use country-level or state-level data (USA).   4
Section 4. The paper discusses the empirical results of the regression analysis in 
Section 5, and gives concluding remarks in Section 6. 
 
2. Institutional settings in the primary health care sector 
 
Responsibility for health services in Norway is rooted in the public sector.
3 The public 
health system is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, 
which is responsible for devising and monitoring national health policy. 




Counties provide specialized medical services, including general and psychiatric 
services and others such as laboratory, radiography, and ambulance services. Primary 
health care, including both preventive and curative treatment, is in the hands of 
municipalities. Municipalities are required by law to offer services for disease 
prevention and health promotion, diagnosis and treatment of illness, rehabilitation, 
and long-term care. There are no defined minimum standards regarding level or 
quality of health services. 
 
The primary health care sector is financed through grants from municipalities, 
retrospective reimbursement by the National Insurance Scheme (NIS) for services 
supplied, and out-of-pocket payments by patients. Major responsibilities of the 
Norwegian primary health care sector can be grouped as follows. Firstly, 
municipalities have responsibility for the promotion of health and prevention of 
illness and injuries, including organizing and running school health services, health 
centres, and child health care by health visitors, midwives, and physicians. Secondly, 
municipalities have responsibility for diagnosis, treatment, and rehabilitation, 
including general medical treatment, physiotherapy, and nursing. Thirdly, 
municipalities have responsibility for nursing and care within and outside institutions, 
including running nursing homes, home nursing, and several other activities. 
                                                 
3 For a more thorough description of the Norwegian health sector, see van der Noord et al. (1998). 
4 The national authorities have retained some delivery mandates as well, including the control of 
several national councils, research institutions, the National Hospital of Norway (Rikshospitalet), the 
National Cancer Hospital (Radiumhospitalet) and a few other highly specialized hospitals.   5
 
The total number of GPs per 1000 capita increased from 0.9 in 1986 to 1.1 in 2001.
5 
Two groups of GPs provide primary health services: GPs employed by the 
municipality, and self-employed GPs contracted to the municipality (fee-for-service 
GPs). Both employed and fee-for-service GPs work separately from hospital services 
and provide the first contact between patients and health services. Salaried physicians 
employed by the municipality typically work at health centres, often in group practice 
with other physicians. They are on a fixed salary, and the municipality generally 
determines their working hours and tasks. Fee-for-service physicians have a contract 
with the municipality to cover some expenses (about 30 per cent of physicians’ gross 
income). As well, they obtain income from patient fees and a fixed fee reimbursement 
scheme from the National Insurance Administration. Contract physicians can, largely, 
make their own decisions about the number of hours worked. The proportion of 
contract physicians has increased from 0.39 in 1986 to 0.56 in 2001. 
 
Municipalities have a legal obligation to employ physicians to carry out certain 
administrative, emergency, and clinical functions. Beyond this, there is no legislation 
regarding minimum requirements for physician–patient ratios. However, in order to 
secure a geographically balanced distribution of doctors, a commission comprising 
members from the central government and the Norwegian Medical Association 
(NMA) regulates the establishment of new positions for both GPs and hospital 
specialists. This means that municipalities need approval from the commission to 
establish new physician positions. Municipalities have an average gross expenditure 
of NOK 700 per inhabitant (84 euro) for each GP. Expenses vary from around NOK 
500 (60 euro) per inhabitant for the largest municipalities to around NOK 2300 (277 
euro) per inhabitant for the smallest municipalities. 
 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
 
We use data from Norwegian municipalities for the 16-year period from 1986 to 
2001. Data were gathered from Statistics Norway and from the Norwegian Social 
                                                 
5 The number of GPs per 1000 capita varies in different countries: France (1.6), Germany (1.1), Italy 
(0.9), Sweden (0.5), UK (0.6), and USA (0.8).   6
Science Data Services (NSD). The health outcomes reported here are total mortality 
rates and deaths due to four groups of causes. The classification of causes of deaths 
follows the ICD-10 system classification system. The four main groups are: C = 
malignant neoplasm (cancer); I = diseases of the circulatory system (cerebrovascular 
disease, ischaemic heart disease, and other heart diseases); J = diseases of the 
respiratory system (for example, pneumonia, bronchitis, emphysema, and asthma); 
and O = other causes (for example, accidents, suicide, diseases in the digestive 
system, and mental disorders).
6 Table 1 explains the variables and Table 2 gives 
descriptive statistics for different measures of mortality and explanatory variables we 
use in the empirical analyses.  
 
Total mortality and most specific mortality rates have declined over time, although 
the changes over the 16-year period in this analysis were small (see Table 2).
7 Total 
mortality rates have decreased from 11.1 per 1000 inhabitants in 1986 to 10.8 in 2001. 
Mortality group C (cancer, etc) has increased from 2.3 per 1000 inhabitants in 1986 to 
2.7 per 1000 inhabitants in 2001. Diseases in the circulatory system (group I in the 
ICD-10 classification system) are the most common causes of death in the statistics. 
The numbers in this group decreased from 5.6 deaths per 1000 inhabitants in 1986 to 
4.6 in 2001. As a percentage of all deaths, this group decreased from 50 per cent in 
1986 to 42 per cent in 1992. The numbers for group J (respiratory diseases) varies 
from year to year, with a peak in 1993. Figure 1 measures the percentage change in 
mortality rates using 1986 as a reference point, and depicts the fluctuations in specific 
mortality rates over time. 
 
There has been an increase from 0.90 physicians engaged in primary health care per 
1000 inhabitants in 1986 (around 3200 GPs) to 1.10 physicians per inhabitant in 2001 
(around 4100 GPs) (see Table 2 for details). Most of these GPs are engaged in 
                                                 
6 We do not focus on infant mortality because deaths among the youngest do not contribute 
significantly to the improvement of life expectancy in Norway as they did during the first half of the 
20th century. Each year, of the total of around 56,000 births, fewer than 200 children die before the age 
of one. In the USA, more than two-thirds of life expectancy improvements resulted from reductions in 
mortality for those over the age of 45 years (Cutler and Meara, 2001). 
7 Mortality rates also vary substantially across municipalities. The 10-percentile mortality rate in 2001 
was 7 per 1000 inhabitants, and the 90-percentile mortality rate at the municipality level was around 16 
per 1000 inhabitants. Some of the variation in mortality is obviously due to the fact that many 
municipalities are small in terms of population. In these small municipalities one or two deaths will 
have a large influence on mortality rates, and we have therefore dropped observation with mortality 
rates lower than the 5 % percentile and higher than the 95 % percentile.    7
diagnosis, treatment, and rehabilitation (3375 person-labour years in 2001).
8 The 
corresponding figures for physicians working in the school health services/child 
health care and nursing homes/other institutions were 231 and 249, respectively. 
There has been a steady increase in the number of GPs at the municipality level over 
time. The increase in the number of GPs was 20 per cent from 1986 to 2001 (see 
Figure 2 for more details). 
 
The number of GPs per 1000 inhabitants varies significantly across municipalities. 
Contrary to most OECD countries, Norway has a relatively high per 1000 capita 
supply of GPs in rural compared with urban areas, and the number of physicians per 
1000 inhabitants is higher in rural areas than in urban municipalities. This is partly 
due to the legal obligation for even the smallest municipalities to employ a GP. In 
addition, the administrative and emergency component of primary health care requires 
more physicians per inhabitant in small municipalities. The number of physicians per 
1000 inhabitants was 1.32 in rural areas in 2001. These municipalities have on 
average around 3000 inhabitants. In urban municipalities, with an average population 




Most GPs prefer to work in larger cities and municipalities. Thus, many smaller 
municipalities have difficulty attracting GPs to work for them. The number of vacant 
GP positions per 1000 inhabitants was around 0.06 in both 1986 and 2001. This is 
around 6 per cent of all GPs. However, the numbers of vacant positions vary from 
year to year (see Figure 2). The number of vacant GP positions per 1000 inhabitants 
was only 0.05 in 1994 compared with 0.10 per 1000 inhabitants in 2000. As is clear 
from Figure 2, the fluctuation in numbers of vacant GP positions does not follow a 
systematic pattern. However, the new patient list system was introduced in 2001, 
making it more attractive to hold a GP position compared with other type of positions 
                                                 
8 These data are only available from 2001. 
9 The percentage of municipalities defined as urban and rural has been constant over time in the data 
set we are analysing. Since our fixed-effects model assumes time-varying variables, the rural–urban 
distinction is not included as a variable in the regression. An alternative estimation strategy would be to 
run regressions for urban and rural municipalities separately, which we did in an earlier version of the 
paper. The results from these regressions are not included in this paper. We have included interaction 
terms between GPs and population size, and also interaction terms between vacant GPs and population 
size. The effect of these interaction terms on mortality rates was not significantly different from zero, 
and they are not included in the final regressions.   8
for medical doctors. This can explain the drop in number of vacant GP positions in 
2001. 
 
The number of fee-for-service GPs versus independent GPs also varies considerably 
between municipalities and over time. The number of fee-for-service GPs increased 
from 0.39 in 1986 to 0.56 per 1000 inhabitants in 2001 (see Table 2). The ratio of fee-
for-service GPs over total number of GPs increased from 39 per cent in 1986 to 51 per 
cent in 2001. For more details about the change in the number of fee-for-service GPs 
and total number of GPs over time, see Figure 3. 
 
Table 2 shows that the population is ageing, which is evident even for the short period 
1986–2001. In 1986, 3.9 per cent of the population was above the age of 80 years. By 
2001, this proportion had increased to 5.1 per cent. This is an increase of 30 per cent 
over a 15-year period. The population between 67 and 79 years has decreased slightly 
from 11.2 per cent in 1986 to 10.1 per cent in 2001.  
 
4. Econometric issues 
 
The aim of this paper is to examine the relationship between the availability of 
physicians and health outcomes in Norwegian municipalities. To investigate factors 
that determine the health status of a population, an aggregate health production 
function is a natural starting point. That means that we consider the health status of a 
municipality’s population as the outcome of a production process where medical and 
non-medical resources or characteristics are used as inputs. As described in the 
previous section we use mortality per 1000 inhabitants (total mortality and four 
specific mortality measures) as a measure of health outcomes. Our key explanatory 
variables are the ones that measure different aspects of each municipality’s workforce 
of GPs: “number of GPs”, “number of vacant GP positions”, and “number of fee-for-
service versus employed GPs”. In order to estimate reliably the effects of these 
variables, we must address several problems. We start by describing what we consider 
the three main problems to be, and thereafter we present an econometric model that 
has potential for solving these problems. 
   9
First, even though we control for a number of municipal characteristics, 
municipalities are likely to have unmeasured attributes (lifestyle factors like tobacco 
and alcohol consumption, number of health care personnel other than physicians, 
capacity in institutions for elderly, distance to hospitals, etc) that may affect mortality 
rates. These unobserved factors are most likely correlated with the explanatory 
variables, and, unless controlled for in the regressions, this leads to an omitted 
variable bias. Therefore, incorporating municipal fixed effects seems particularly 
important in this analysis. 
 
Second, another source of omitted variable bias is an assumption that health status is 
static, i.e., explained solely by contemporaneous characteristics and circumstances. 
While contemporary circumstances obviously affect the health status of a population, 
current health will also depend on previous health. To control for this omitted variable 
bias, a dynamic panel data model is needed. 
 
Third, as noted in a seminal paper by Auster et al. (1969), the direction of causality 
between health status and number of physicians is not clear. In municipalities whose 
populations are exposed to an increased risk of death, the demand for physician 
services is probably particularly high. The variables “vacant GP positions” and 
“contract GPs” are probably endogenous as well, and not controlling for this will 
result in biased estimates of the effect of these variables.  
 
To consider these issues, we specify the following dynamic health production 
function: 
 
  it i it it t i it e f X GP M M + + + + + = − β α γ β 1 , 0 ,    (1) 
 
where  it M  is the mortality rate in municipality i at time t, and  1 , − t i M  is the mortality 
rate in municipality i in the previous period. By including previous values of mortality 
we allow for the possibility that current health depends on past health status through a 
partial adjustment mechanism.  it GP  is a vector of GP variables where all three 
variables are treated as endogenous,  it X  are other explanatory and control variables,   10
i f  is an unobserved municipality-specific time-invariant effect, and  it e  is a 
disturbance term. This is a dynamic panel data model and may be estimated by 
standard GMM methods. First, equation (1) is first-differenced to get rid of the 
municipality fixed effects  i f , which may be correlated with the right-hand side 
variables of interest. With T time periods, the estimating dynamic health production 
function becomes 
 
  it it it t i it e X GP M M ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ − β α γ 1 , ,  T t ,..., 2 = ,                                      (2) 
 
where  ∆ is the difference operator ( 1 , , , − − = ∆ t i t i t i M M M  etc.). Differencing 
eliminates the municipal-specific effect, but introduces a new bias. By construction 
the new error term, ∆eit = eit − ei,t−1 is correlated with the lagged dependent variable 
∆Mi,t−1 = Mi,t−1 − Mi,t−2. Notice however that Mi,t-s and ∆Mi,t-s are uncorrelated with ∆eit 
and therefore are valid instruments for s ≥ 2 (serial correlation has been ruled out by 
assumption). Arellano and Bond’s (1991) GMM estimator exploits all possible 
moment restrictions in levels for each period t  ≥ 3. The number of available 
restrictions increases with t: 
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In the case where the explanatory variables are assumed to be endogenous they are 
treated symmetrically with the dependent variable. In our case, we assume the GP 
variables (the GP-vector) to be endogenous, and the lagged values  2 , − t i GP ,  3 , − t i GP , 
etc. are therefore valid instruments for periods  T t ,..., 4 , 3 = . The rest of the 
explanatory variables (the X-vector) are treated as strictly exogenous, so this entire 
vector is also available as instruments. 
 
Utilizing these moment conditions, a two-step GMM estimator can be used to 
estimate the differenced equation. More recently, Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998) show that the efficiency of the Arellano and Bond (1991)   11
GMM estimator may be dramatically improved by using an extended system GMM 
estimator that uses lagged differences as instruments for equations in levels, in 
addition to lagged levels of the instruments for equations in first differences. In this 
paper, we report both the “ordinary” GMM and “system” GMM results. The validity 
of the over-identifying restrictions may be tested using a Sargan test. If the eit are 
serially uncorrelated, then the residuals in the first-differenced model are first-order 
correlated, but should not show any second-order serial correlation. These restrictions 
may be tested (see Arellano and Bond, 1991, or Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
  
5. Empirical results 
 
In Table 3 we report results from static (OLS and fixed-effects) and dynamic (GMM 
and GMM-SYS) health production functions. Focusing first on the dynamic models, 
we note that the specification tests are satisfactory
10. The Sargan tests do not reject the 
over-identifying restrictions and the tests regarding serial correlation reject the 
absence of first-order, but not second-order serial correlation. The dependent variable 
in the regressions in Table 3 is the total mortality rate in the municipalities. From the 
dynamic models we see that the lag of the dependent variable is positive and 
significant. This certainly rejects a static model, previously used in the literature, in 
favour of a dynamic and indicates some degree of persistence in the mortality ratio 
over time. Further, the estimated effect of most explanatory variables differs both 
between the dynamic and static models and between the GMM and GMM-SYS 
models. Most important is that the conclusions regarding the three GP variables differ 
substantially between the models.
11  
 
                                                 
10 Results are reported for two-step GMM and GMM-SYS estimators. However, one- and two-step 
results are very similar.  
11 We have included many different variables for other types of medical personnel in our regressions, 
such as per capita number of nurses (different types), total number of employed persons in primary care 
except GPs, etc. We have also included measures for total expenditures on primary care. These 
variables were not significantly different from zero and did not affect the main variables in our 
regressions. Thus, we have dropped these variables from the regressions reported in this paper.    12
In the static models, the variable measuring the number of GPs in the municipality is 
positive, but insignificant.
12 If anything, this indicates that the mortality rate increases 
with the number of physicians in the municipality. The variable “number vacant GP 
positions” is positive and significant, indicating that an increased number of vacant 
positions increase the mortality rate. The last variable measuring contract GPs is 
negatively significant in the fixed-effects model, but insignificant in the OLS model. 
However, these variables are probably endogenous. For example, the number of GPs 
is most likely simultaneously determined and not controlling for this endogeneity 
problem will lead to an upward-biased estimate of the variable (since municipalities 
where the mortality rate is high on average tend to have more physicians per 
inhabitant than elsewhere).  
 
In the two dynamic models (GMM and GMM-SYS) the number of GPs, vacant GPs 
and contract GPs are treated as endogenous. From Table 3 we see that the estimated 
effects of the GPs variables are quite different from those in the static models. In both 
the GMM and GMM-SYS models, the coefficient on the number of GPs has the 
expected negative sign, but is still insignificant
13. The coefficient on vacant GPs goes 
from positive and significant in the fixed-effects model to negative and insignificant 
in the dynamic models. Thus, given the current level of GPs, neither of them affects 
total mortality rates. The composition of GPs, on the other hand, seems to have some 
influence on the mortality rate. More fee-for-service GPs compared with GPs 
employed by the municipality decreases mortality rates. However, this effect is only 
significant in the GMM-SYS model, and only at the 10 per cent level.  
 
In Table 4 we present results from GMM-SYS models where we distinguish between 
four groups of mortality rates (cancer, circulatory system, respiratory system, and 
other causes). Our conclusions regarding the GP variables remain the same, however. 
The effect of number of GPs is negative, but insignificant in all four models. Given 
the current level of GPs, vacant positions have no effect on mortality rates. Increasing 
                                                 
12 Notice however, that the number of GPs is negative and significant if we run regressions without the 
vacant GPs variable. The number of vacant GP positions may be interpreted as measuring unmet 
demand. 
13 We have estimated several models where we included lags on the physician variable. However, these 
lags were not significant.   13
the number of fee-for-service GPs compared with the number of employed GPs 
reduces mortality rates, but only for mortality group C (cancer) and O (other causes).  
 
Looking at the other explanatory variables, it is not surprising to find age is an 
important variable explaining mortality rates at the municipality level. A larger 
proportion of persons in the age groups 67 to 79 and above 80 significantly increase 
the mortality rate. These effects are found in all models, except for mortality J 
(respiratory diseases) in the age group 67–79. Leu (1986) found that the proportion of 
the population over 65 years of age was the most important determinant of differences 
in crude mortality rates among countries. 
 
We find a significant negative effect of education on mortality rates, where we use the 
proportion of persons with education at high school level or higher as the explanatory 
variable. Many studies have found a significant link between schooling and health 
status (Auster et al., 1969; Grossman, 1972; Kemna, 1987). Fuchs (1998) also pointed 
to the striking negative correlation between number of years of schooling and 
mortality, especially for the USA. The effect of education on mortality in our data is 
small in terms of absolute value. One predicts an increase of around 100 persons in 
the highest educational group to reduce the number of deaths. However, we do not 
find the same clear effect of education when we divide mortality into different causes 
of death. Table 4 shows that this effect is significant only for mortality due to diseases 
of the respiratory system (group J). See also Bosma et al. (1999) and Deaton and 
Paxson (1999) for a discussion of the effect of education on mortality rates. 
 
In our study, we find a non-significant relationship between unemployment and 
mortality except for the wrongly specified OLS model. Ruhm (2000) analysed the 
relationship between unemployment and total (and age-specific) mortality rates, using 
US state level data for the 1972–1991 period. He found that total mortality exhibited a 
procyclical variation. However, the expected life span in Norway at birth is 82 years 
for females and 77 years for males. Thus, most people who die are pensioners, and the 
non-significant coefficient on unemployment is as expected.
14  
                                                 
14 Cutler et al. (2002) used time series data from Mexico to analyse the relationship between mortality 
and economic crises. They found that mortality rates increased with economic crises, among the elderly 
and possibly among the very young. They discussed the reasons for an inverse relationship between   14
6. Concluding remarks 
 
This study found no significant relationship between mortality rates and the per capita 
number of GPs in a model that a) incorporates municipal fixed effects to allow for 
unmeasured factors, b) allows for time persistence in mortality rates, and c) treats the 
number of GPs in a district as endogenous. However, there is a significant effect of 
the composition of GPs, where the presence of more independent contract GPs 
reduces mortality rates compared with situations where more of the GPs are employed 
by the municipality. 
 
Patients uniformly complain about long waiting times and lack of personal contact 
with GPs, as reflected in short consultations and long waiting times before the 
consultation takes place (Johnsen and Holtedahl, 1997). Since contracted self-
employed GPs are paid by number of consultations and activity, there is an incentive 
for increased productivity and possible better quality in self-employed GP practices 
compared with where GPs are employed by the municipality on fixed salaries. Fixed 
salary contracts are sometimes used to recruit and retain GPs, especially in rural 
municipalities where the turnover rate can be high. Carlsen and Grytten (2000) found 
that places where relatively more physicians are municipally employed were 
associated with lower consumer satisfaction. The link between employed GPs and 
satisfaction can be explained by longer waiting times and thus poorer access to health 
care, and possibly also lower quality of care. These mechanisms can explain the 
positive effect on mortality rates of an increase in contract GPs relative to employed 
GPs. 
 
This study cannot be used to determine the optimal number of GPs at the municipality 
level. We focused on the marginal effect of GPs from the current level of the per 
capita number of GPs. Given that we measured the effect of additional GPs on 
mortality rates, it is difficult to judge the effect and benefits of GPs, and compare 
them with the costs, because the effect on mortality is not usually translated into 
                                                                                                                                            
mortality and economic crises. These were: 1) economic downturns reduce income, which reduces 
resources for consumption and investment of goods that improve or maintain good health; 2) economic 
downturns reduce public spending on health, which may affect groups particularly dependent on the 
public health system; and 3) crises and economic conditions affect the informal care that families can 
provide for children and the aged.   15
monetary equivalents. What is one extra year of life worth for one person and can this 
be compared with the cost to society of an extra GP? An alternative research strategy 
could measure cost per quality-adjusted life years (QALY). This measure combines 
both saved life years and quality of life, and could be used to compare the cost-
effectiveness of different interventions. We did not have measures of quality of life at 
the municipality level, and such a measure is not usually available for this type of 
research. Future work will show if extra GPs affect the quality aspects of life rather 
than only crude mortality rates. 
 
Even though we found no effect of additional GPs at the current level on mortality 
rates, we did find a positive effect on mortality rates from increasing the number of 
self-employed contract GPs relatively to GPs employed by the municipality on fixed 
salary contracts. Employed GPs have weaker incentives to see patients when 
compared with contract (fee-for-service) GPs, resulting in poorer access to care and 
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 Table 1. Variable descriptions. 
Mortality ratio  Number of deaths per 1000 inhabitants 
Mortality ratio C  Number of deaths due to malignant neoplasm (cancer) per 
1000 inhabitants 
Mortality ratio I  Number of deaths due to diseases of the circulatory system 
per 1000 inhabitants 
Mortality ratio J  Number of deaths due to diseases of the respiratory system 
per 1000 inhabitants 
Mortality ratio O  Number of deaths due to other causes per 1000 inhabitants 
GPs  Number of GPs per 1000 inhabitants 
Vacant GPs  Number of vacant GPs per 1000 inhabitants 
Contract GPs  Number of employed GPs/number of contract GPs 
Age67-79  Proportion of inhabitants older than 66 and younger than 
80 
Age80+  Proportion of inhabitants older than 80 
High education  Percentage with high education in the municipality, 
inhabitants older than 20 
Disability Percentage  of  disabled in the municipality, inhabitants 
older than 20 
Unemployment Percentage  of  unemployed in the municipality, inhabitants 
older than 20 
Divorce rate  Number of divorces per 1000 inhabitants, older than 20 



























 Table 2. Descriptive statistics by year. 
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Municipalities  339 333 346 363 373 366 391 365 384 392 398 400 393 401 407 406 
 
 
 Table 3. Explaining municipal mortality. Static and dynamic models. 
  OLS  Fixed effect  GMM  GMM-SYS 





GPs  0.107 (0.088)  0.035 (0.143)  -0.479 (0.938)  -0.331 (0.478) 




  -0.591 (0.674)  -0.385 (0.518) 











































































  -0.185 (0.182)  4.048
*** (1.164)
 
Y1987  -0.005 (0.148)  0.029 (0.139) 
   
Y1988  -0.018 (0.148)  0.110 (0.149) 
  0.041 (0.166) 




























































*** (0.179)  -0.518 (0.339)  -0.069
 (0.217)
  -0.418 (0.286) 
Y1999 -0.357
** (0.187)  -0.328 (0.371)  0.276 (0.223)  -0.273 (0.296) 
Y2000  -0.322 (0.222)  -0.292 (0.524)  0.245 (0.393)  -0.306 (0.406) 
Y2001 -0.470
* (0.225)  -0.441 (0.532)  -0.072 (0.212)  -0.393 (0.429) 
Observations 6052 6052 5183 5621 
AR(1) test      -9.769  -9.379 
(p-value)     0.000  0.000 
AR(2) test      0.686  1.434 
(p-value)     0.492  0.152 
Sargan test      260.8  329.7 
(p-value)     0.677  0.463 
 
Results from two-step GMM and GMM-SYS estimator. 
***: significant at the 1 percent level, 
**: significant at the 5 percent level, 
*: significant at the 10 percent level. Table 4. Explaining municipal mortality. GMM-SYS models.  
  Mortality C  Mortality I  Mortality J  Mortality O 









GPs  -0.243 (0.206)  -0.106 (0.396)  -0.136 (0.139)  -0.063 (0.228) 
Vacant GPs  0.011 (0.242)  -0.058 (0.389)  -0.027 (0.163)  -0.046 (0.279) 






















































Divorce rate  0.028
 (0.023)























Y1988  0.122 (0.084)  -0.110 (0.133)  0.133
** (0.055)
  -0.107 (0.081) 






































































































  0.190 (0.192)
 
Observations 5621 5621 5621 5621 
      
AR(1)  test  -8.845 -9.374 -8.161 -8.277 
(p-value)  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2)  test  1.917 1.569 1.172 0.861 
(p-value)  0.055 0.117 0.190 0.389 
Sargan  test  409.6 414.0 406.3 409.0 
(p-value)  0.684 0.776 0.588 0.585 
 
Results from two-step GMM-SYS estimator. 
***: significant at the 1 percent level, 
**: significant at the 5 percent level, 
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